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The effect of privatization on labor has been one of the least addressed issues. This paper evaluates
the impact of privatization on dismissed workers in Turkey. Earnings equations at state employment and
after dismissal are estimated and compared to evaluate the changes in worker’s welfare. Dismissed workers
experienced significant earnings losses upon reemployment. Earnings losses were smaller for the self-
employed than for the wage employed. Post-dismissal jobs were not only characterized by lower earnings
but also by a lower quality of non-monetary attributes. The magnitude of the true welfare losses is inferred
from the subjective evaluations provided by the workers themselves. Workers felt that what they had lost
had not been fully compensated by the severance pay they received.
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1.  Introduction
This study, on the impact of privatization on dismissed workers in Turkey, is the
first of its kind.  It is based on interviews with dismissed workers in the cement and the
petrochemical sectors.  Dismissed workers were interviewed about both the conditions of
their state employment and their post-dismissal labor market experience; they were also
asked to make pre- and post-dismissal welfare comparisons.  Data from these interviews
are analyzed in this paper, mainly through the estimation of earnings equations at state
employment and after dismissal.
The results show that dismissed workers suffered significant earnings losses upon
re-employment, losses that amounted to an average of 66 percent of their state earnings.
Nonetheless, those earnings losses were smaller for self-employed workers (as opposed to
the wage employed), for better-educated workers, for younger workers and for cement
workers (relative to petrochemical workers).  Earnings losses were not significantly
influenced by the tenure at state employment, although a longer tenure significantly
reduced the probability of employment after dismissal.
There was evidence that the losses may reflect the loss of noncompetitive rents at
state employment.  To the extent that most post-dismissal jobs lacked formal
arrangements and social benefits this implies that most workers moved to the informal
sector.  Welfare losses were probably higher than those indicated by the earnings losses,
since the post-dismissal jobs not only paid lower monetary remunerations but were also of
lower quality than the state jobs.  The non-monetary aspects of losses are captured by two
questions, which required workers’ subjective evaluations of their pre- and post-dismissal
welfare.   The overwhelming majority of workers considered their current welfare worse
than it had been during state employment and would have preferred to go back if they
could.  This suggests that the attractive monetary and non-monetary conditions of state
employment were unattainable in the private sector.
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 gives information about
privatization in Turkey.  The details of the data collection process are given in Section 3
along with major characteristics of the interviewed workers.  The estimation results for3
earnings equations and welfare loss equations are provided in Sections 4 and 5
respectively.  Finally the concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
2.  Privatization in Turkey
The history of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Turkey goes back to the early
1930s; by the early 1980s, however, a move for privatization of those enterprises was
under way.  Reducing the economic activities of the state was one of the aims of the
January 24, 1980 Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Program. Privatization was on
the agenda of successive governments and gained momentum in the late 1980s.  Although
the public employment share in Turkey’s total employment is not very high (9.8 percent
in the civil service and 3.2 percent in SOEs in 1993) it nonetheless accounts for a large
share of wage earners (about 30 percent in 1993) (OECD, 1996).
The state cement industry owned 26 plants scattered around the country.  Five of
its plants were sold in 1989 to a French concern by block sale.  Three of them are
included in the present study.  The four other plants included in this study were privatized
partly by offering shares to public and partly by block sale.  The cement plants,
particularly those located in the west of the country, were highly profitable.  This was
partly due to market power.  There were marked improvements in labor productivity in
some of the plants after privatization, which was attributed to a decline in employment, a
policy pursued by the new management.
The state petrochemical industry, Petkim Petrochemicals A.S., owned two plants.
A first complex had been established in 1965; the second one was added in 1984.  Petkim
assumed the status of under consideration for privatization in 1987.  In 1990, partial
privatization was achieved by selling 8 percent of Petkim’s shares.  Throughout its history
Petkim has been a profitable SOE, possibly due to its monopoly power in the product
market.  Profitability increased in the 1990s, due to the rehabilitation process undertaken
in the industry.
In the cement factories, the new owners conducted the dismissals after the
privatization process. This provides an example of a case where labor restructuring was
left to new investors who are in a better position to judge their own labor needs. However,4
in the petrochemicals complex government assumed the responsibility for labor
restructuring before privatization. The petrochemicals firm was given the status of under
consideration for privatization. This period was used to dismiss workers. Such
restructuring prior to privatization was expected to increase the attractiveness and the
value of the firm to the prospective buyers.
Until the promulgation of the privatization law (Law No. 4046) in November
1994, the Labor Law was used to dismiss workers from privatized organizations.
Workers interviewed for this study were dismissed according to Article 13 of the Labor
Law.  According to Article 13, an open-ended contract can be terminated through a
written notification of the employer and the worker is entitled to severance compensation.
It is the lump-sum payment given to a worker whose contract is terminated and who has
at least a year of continuous service in that employment.  Each year of employment at an
establishment is rewarded with thirty days of pay in the severance compensation.  The last
daily gross wage to which wage supplements of a continuous nature are added is the basis
for severance.  Further details can be found in Tansel (1999). While dismissed workers
from cement factories were of all ages, those from petrochemicals firms were
substantially older. They were chosen from among those eligible for retirement. This
strategy helped to resolve potential labor conflicts.
3.  Data
I collected the data analyzed in this paper through interviews with dismissed
individual workers.  The interviews took place during the period of May through
December of 1995.  A total of 563 former workers of the cement factories in Ankara,
Balıkesir, Denizli, İskenderun Niğde and Söke were interviewed in each of these cities
and their environs.  A total of 682 former workers of Petkim in İzmir, İzmit and environs
were interviewed. Of the total 1245 workers interviewed, 859 of which were retired after
dismissal while 240 of the retirees continued to work. This provided a total of 579
currently working people on which the tables and regressions in this paper are based.
About half of the retirees stated that they were looking for a job and would work if they
find a suitable one.5
With the help of the cement workers’ union (Çimse-Is), some of the cement plants
agreed to provide a list of all the workers dismissed since privatization.  In some cases,
the local chapter of the union provided partial lists.  It was possible to interview, on
average 63 percent of the workers in the lists.  Some of the workers had moved, some had
died and some refused to interview.  When the cost of going to another town was
reasonable and when there were two or more workers to be interviewed, I attempted to
track down the migrant workers.  Since many of their addresses were in rural areas, the
sample may under represent those workers who moved and took up farming after
dismissal.  Potential selectivity bias introduced by this process is not addressed in this
work due to lack of necessary data.
As seen in the Appendix Table, there were twice as many Petkim as cement
workers with a regular or vocational high school education or higher.  Furthermore, the
overall mean years of schooling (7.5 years) of sample workers in both industries were
about a year and one-half greater than the mean years of schooling (5.95 years in 1990) of
the male labor force of Turkey (Tansel and Güngör, 1998). 
The current earnings of both cement and petrochemical workers dropped after
leaving state employment.
1,2  Current earnings actually dropped even if the potential
income from the severance pay received, calculated under the assumption of a 10 percent
real rate of return, was taken into account.  When asked to compare pre -and post-
dismissal levels of income, about 92 percent of the cement and 87 percent of the Petkim
workers said that their post-dismissal level of income was lower or much lower than their
level of income during state employment.
                                                          
1 All of the monetary figures in this study are deflated by the monthly consumer price index (CPI) of
base 1987. The cities of Ankara, Izmir and Konya are assigned their monthly CPIs. The other cities
in the study are assigned the monthly CPI of the region in which they are located. They are
assigned the regional urban or rural monthly CPI according to whether their population is over or
under 20,000. Since the severance compensation is asked retroactively, the figures are deflated by
the similar indices applicable to the layoff dates. Since the interviews were implemented during
May-December 1995, the current earnings are deflated by the monthly CPIs. The annual rate of
inflation was 97 percent in 1995.
2  Obviously, the workers do not work the same amount of hours in their current jobs. Rather than
computing the hourly wage I have instead used the monthly wage since there were very few (2.2
percent), less than full-time workers.  The majority of the workers worked eight hours or more.6
Almost all the workers had subsidized lunch, free transportation service to work,
heating fuel, and child support at their state jobs.  In the post-dismissal jobs however,
more than half of the sample had no such payments in kind.  Whereas the social security
coverage was 100 percent at the state employment, in the post-dismissal period this
coverage dropped substantially.  In their state jobs, about 97 percent of the cement
workers and 87 percent of the Petkim workers were union members.  In the post-
dismissal sample, union membership was nil.  Thus, the post-dismissal jobs not only paid
lower wages, but were also lower quality in terms of payments in kind, fringe benefits,
job security and probably in the work effort required.
The 50 percent labor force participation rate among the dismissed workers is
lower than the urban male participation rate of 85 percent for the 25-54 age group in
Turkey (SIS, 1996: 103).  Among the post-dismissal labor force participants, the
unemployment rate was 6.7 percent, which is about the same as the urban male
unemployment rate of 6.3 percent for the 25-54 age group in Turkey (SIS, 1996: 135).
The unemployment rate and the unemployment spell were higher among the cement than
the Petkim workers.  This may be related to their lower educational attainments or to
regional characteristics.
About half of the active workers were self-employed.  This is much higher than
the 19 percent rate for self-employed among Turkey’s urban male population (SIS,
1996:121).   The severance payment received, in the current environment of high cost
credit, may have facilitated the dismissed workers in the sample to establish their own
business.  Among the self-employed, retail trade was the most common sector of work
compared to other service sector activities or manufacturing.
The average spell of unemployment was 6.6 months among the self-employed and
9.1 months among the wage earners.  In the sample, 35 percent of the self-employed and
15 percent of the wage earners experienced no spell of unemployment following
dismissal.  This suggests that the self-employed experienced easier transitions to the
private sector than the wage employed.  Longer spells of unemployment among wage
earners relative to the self employed could be the result of the search for hard to come by
formal sector wage earner positions, similar to those positions once held.  These patterns7
are similar to those observed in Britain.  In the Michelin Redundancy Study, Leslie (1990)
found that self-employment proportion adjustment times were substantially shorter than
those for contractual employment to equilibrium.
4.  Earnings Equations
i) Mincerian Earnings Equations
In order to examine the factors that influence state and post-dismissal earnings,
Mincerian earnings equations of the following form are estimated:
log Wi = β Xi + ε i
where log W is the natural logarithm of the monthly earnings, X is a vector of
independent variables that includes personal and human capital characteristics of the
workers and  ε i’s are the independently distributed disturbances with zero mean and
constant variance.  For the state earnings equation, hourly earnings is not considered since
hours worked is not at  worker’s discretion.  For the post-dismissal earnings equation to
control for the different hours of work, I included unearned income and dummy variable
indicating age 50 and over among the explanatory variables since they may affect the
decision on hours of work.  Education levels are the dummy variables indicating
graduation at that level.  Primary school graduation is the base.  State tenure is the
number of years of work at the state employment.  Pre-state tenure is the number of years
of work before state employment.  A dummy variable, indicating that the worker is a
wage earner is also included in the post-dismissal earnings equation.
ii) State Earnings Equations:
A test of the hypothesis of equality of the earnings equations for the cement and
petrochemical sectors rejects the null at the five percent level of significance.
Accordingly, equations for the cement and Petkim workers are presented separately in
Table 1.  The education coefficients were jointly statistically significant and individually8
significant except at the university level for cement workers (possibly due to small
number of observations at this level) and at the middle school level for Petkim workers.
Years of tenure at the state employment were statistically significant with a larger impact
for Petkim than for cement workers.  The coefficient estimates on the dummy variables
indicating marital status, gender and family size, were statistically insignificant.
However, earnings in the cement sector were about 15 percent lower than earnings in the
petrochemical sector.  This sectoral gap is consistent with the findings of Krueger and
Summers (1988) regarding the inter-industry wage structure in the US, where the cement
sector also pays less than the petrochemical sector.
Table 1: OLS Estimates of State Earnings Models
Cement Petkim Total
Variables Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio
Education:
   Middle School
   High School
   Voc. High School

































































































Notes:  K is the number of independent variables, N is the sample size.  The equations also included the
location dummy variables for Balıkesir, Denizli, İskenderun, Konya, Niğde, Söke for the cement
equation; Yarımca for the Petkim equation and all of them for the total equation to take the local
labor market differences into account.  For brevity, they are not reported.
Probit for Working:
Fifty percent of the dismissed workers continued to participate in the labor force,
while the other fifty percent were no longer economically active.  Results from a probit
estimation for working are presented in Table 2.  Being a graduate of vocational high9
school or university increases the probability of working by about 9 or 32 percent
respectively, while being a graduate of high school or middle school does not contribute
significantly to the probability of working, as compared to being a primary school
graduate.
Years of tenure at state employment significantly reduce the probability of post-
dismissal work.  This may be due to several influences.  First, older workers have less to
gain from investing in a new job because they have fewer active years left.  Second, more
experienced workers have built up more savings.  Third, workers with more tenure have
rights to larger severance pay and thus have less need to invest in a new job.  The last
possibility suggests that a negative estimated coefficient should be expected on the
variable log severance pay.
Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient for log severance pay shows that severance
significantly increases the probability of post-dismissal work, probably because it enables
the self employed to set up a business in the current environment of high cost credit.  This
result is consistent with the findings of Alderman et al. (1996)  for Ghana.  But it is at
odds with the findings of Mills and Sahn (1995) for Guinea, where severance pay
significantly reduces the probability of being employed.
Other individual characteristics influence the probability of working as well.  The
probability is lower for those who are 50 years old or more and for those who retired after
dismissal.  The probability is also lower for women and for those with high-unearned
income.  High-unearned income can be expected to raise the reservation wage.
iii) Post-Dismissal Earnings Equation:
The estimated post-dismissal earnings equation is given in Table 2.  It is corrected
with selectivity using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method with the above discussed
probit selection rule that predicts the probability of working.  The coefficient estimate of
the Inverse Mills Ratio is statistically significant indicating a negative selection bias.
Post-dismissal earnings increase with education and work experience.  The
coefficients on education are statistically significant both jointly and individually, except
at the middle school level.  Pre-state years of work significantly increase post-dismissal10
earnings as well.  But the coefficient on tenure at the state employment is only marginally
significant, implying that the specific skills gained at state employment may not be easily
transferable to the private sector.  This is contrary to what Kletzer (1989) found with US
data: that previous job tenure is positively related to the post-dismissal earnings.
Post-dismissal earnings also vary across jobs.  Particularly, they are 26 percent
lower for wage earners than for the self-employed.  But a dummy variable for workers
from the cement sector is insignificant in the pooled sample; this suggests that post-
dismissal earnings, although smaller for the cement workers, do not statistically differ
from those of Petkim workers.  And regional factors do not matter much either.  Both the
share of industrial output in provincial GDP and the provincial unemployment rate were
also included in order to examine the impact of these local labor market indicators on
current earnings; their coefficient estimates were, however insignificant.
Finally, the post-dismissal earnings equation also takes other potential influences
into account.  It shows that post-dismissal earnings increase significantly with unearned
income.  It also shows that workers who are 50 or more years of age earn significantly
less than the younger.  Marital status, family size and gender, on the other hand, do not
significantly influence post-dismissal earnings.
3
I now compare the state earnings and post-dismissal earnings equations provided
in Table 2 for the 579 currently employed.  The impact of educational attainment,
ignoring the insignificant coefficient for the middle school level, is somewhat larger on
post-dismissal earnings than on state earnings.  The impact of work experience prior to
state employment is larger as well.  And even the impact of tenure in the public sector
appears to be larger on post-dismissal earnings, although it is only marginally significant.
                                                          
3  Since the wage earners earned significantly less than the self employed in their post dismissal jobs,
I estimated their  post-dismissal earnings equations separately, correcting for  selectivity by using
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method with a probit selection rule that predicts the probability of
choosing wage employment conditional on working.  The results indicated that selection bias was
not important in the both wage earner sample and  the self employed sample. In the results for the
wage earners, among the education variables only the university level was statistically significant,
with a large coefficient estimate. Years of work at state employ also significantly increased wage
earnings. In the results for the self employed, high school, vocational high school and university
education significantly increased earnings. Years of work at state’s employ were not statistically
significant while pre-state years of work significantly increased self-employed earnings. These
results are available from the author upon request.11













Effect t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio
Education:
    Middle School
    High School
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State Tenure
Pre State Tenure










































































































































Notes:  K is the number of independent variables, N is the sample size.  The equations also included the
location dummy variables for Balikesir, Denizli, İskenderun, Konya, Niğde, Söke and Yarımca to
take the local labor market differences into account.  For brevity, they are not reported.12
Therefore, returns to education and experience were slightly higher in post-dismissal jobs
than in state employment.
Earnings Losses
Based on the results in Table 2, the predicted value of the log of monthly earnings
for a worker with the mean characteristics of those currently employed is 7.92 at state
employment, compared to 6.91 in the current job.  The fall in earnings was about 10
percent smaller for the self-employed than for the wage employed.  And it was smaller for
cement workers than for Petkim workers.  The fall in earnings also varied with individual
characteristics, as shown in Table 3.  Among workers with different levels of schooling,
general high school graduates experienced the smallest losses, whereas the largest losses
were experienced by middle school graduates.  Overall, the losses were smaller for the
better educated.  Workers under 50 years of age also experienced lower losses than older
workers.  On the other hand, the fall in earnings did not vary much with tenure in the
public sector.
4
The fall in earnings after dismissal may reflect the loss of a good job match or the
loss of non-competitive rents associated with state employment.  In the case of skilled
workers, the fall in earnings could reflect the loss of a good job match.  But non-
competitive rents cannot be excluded in their case either.  In spite of being more educated,
these workers could have a low productivity.  Their dismissal could actually reflect a
decision by firms of getting rid of poorly performing workers (van Ours and Ridder,
1995).
5.  Welfare Losses
Monetary earning losses represent only one aspect of the welfare losses; other
aspects include welfare losses incurred  for lost job security, fringe benefits, health and
                                                          
4  Alderman et al. (1996) found that dismissed Ghanaian civil servants lost about 48 percent of their
civil service earnings.  But the losses were smaller for those who found wage employment than for
those who were self employed. Mills and Sahn (1995) found that earnings actually increased for
those who found wage employment after dismissal in Guinea.13
Table 3: Change in Earnings After Dismissal as a Percentage of State Earnings






Age <  50





        -69     (175)
        -73     (15)
        -64     (22)
        -67     (65)
        -67     (13)
        -68     (264)
        -72     (26)
        -66     (209)
        -73     (81)
        -70     (14)
        -67     (19)
        -59     (154)
        -64     (21)
        -53     (31)
        -57     (63)
        -57     (17)
        -58     (247)
        -64     (42)
        -56     (180)
        -63     (119)
        -61     (9)
        -57     (19)
Source: State earnings and the post-dismissal earnings equations in Table 2.
Notes: The numbers of cases are provided in parentheses.
retirement benefits, and possibly a higher work effort.  There may, however, be welfare
gains associated with additional leisure when applicable.  These other aspects of the
changes in welfare are addressed by two questions touching on subjective evaluations of
previous and current levels of welfare. In the first question, workers were asked to
compare their pre- and post-dismissal welfare.  After considering the severance pay
received, whether they retired or not, and the characteristics of their new job when they
had one, about 92 percent of the cement workers and 85 percent of the Petkim workers
stated that their current situation was worse than during their state employment.  The
respondents were also asked if, had they the choice,  would they have preferred to stay or
leave state employment.  About 93 percent of  the cement workers  and  85  percent  of
the  Petkim workers stated that they would have preferred to stay.  These overwhelmingly
high percentages of workers who preferred the state sector and who considered their
current situation worse than before suggest that workers have suffered significant
monetary and non-monetary welfare losses.14
Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimates for Comparison of Current and
Previous Situations and for Preference to Stay or Leave State Employment
Comparison Preference
Variables: Marginal Effect t-Ratio Marginal Effect t-Ratio
Education:
   Middle School
   High School
   Voc. High School
   University
State Tenure
Pre-State Tenure




































































  Notes: The t-ratios are the absolute values of the asymptotic t-ratios.  The equations also included the
location dummy variables for Balikesir, Denizli, Iskenderun, Konya, Niğde, Söke and Yarımca
to take the local labor market differences into account.  For brevity, they are not reported.
In the estimate of the probability of a same or better current situation presented in
Table 4, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the worker states that his current
situation is the same or better than during the state employment and zero otherwise.
Probability of a same or better current situation was unrelated  to  the  years  of  tenure  at
state employment and to the amount of the severance compensation received.  However,
this probability significantly increased with the level of education: all levels except
middle school contributed both positively and significantly to the probability of a same or
better current situation than before.
In the estimates of probability of preference to stay, given also in Table 4, the
dependent variable takes a value of one if the worker prefers to remain at state
employment and zero otherwise.  The years of tenure and the amount of the severance pay
were not statistically significant.  The probability of the preference to remain at state
employment was significantly higher among those with larger families.  Being 50 or more15
years of age reduces significantly the probability of preference to stay at state
employment.
6.  Conclusions
The effect privatization has on labor is a universal concern. This study evaluates
of the impact of privatization on dismissed workers in Turkey, and focuses specifically on
workers in the cement and petrochemicals sectors.  The author interviewed dismissed
workers from the seven cement plants, which were already privatized, and from the two
petrochemical complexes which were under consideration for privatization.  About 70
percent of the workers interviewed retired upon dismissal or shortly thereafter.  One-third
of the retirees, however, continued to participate in the labor force, which added up to a
50 percent economically active sample.  This participation rate was lower than the urban
male labor force participation rate of the relevant age group in Turkey.  About half of the
dismissed workers still in the labor force were self-employed in their post-dismissal jobs.
This was much higher than the proportion of the self-employed among urban males in
Turkey.  Presumably, the severance pay received was helpful in establishing a business in
the current environment of high cost  credit.  The self-employed in the study also
experienced shorter spells of unemployment than wage earners. This suggests that
training and credit schemes to help dismissed workers become self-employed can be
beneficial. However, analysis of their cost effectiveness is limited (Kikeri, 1998: 25).
Earnings equations at state employment and after dismissal are estimated and
compared to evaluate the changes in workers’ welfare.  These equations show that Petkim
workers had significantly higher earnings at state employment than cement workers.
They also show that dismissed workers experienced significant earnings losses upon re-
employment, amounting on average to 66 percent of their state earnings.  Even if a 10
percent real return on the severance compensation is added to the post-dismissal income,
earnings losses remain sizable.  Earnings losses were smaller for the self-employed than
for the wage employed; for the better educated, for the younger workers and for the
cement workers as compared to Petkim workers.  The earning losses were not16
significantly influenced by the tenure at state employment.  It is plausible that the
earnings losses reflect non-competitive rents associated with state employment.
Post-dismissal jobs were not only characterized by lower earnings, but also by a
lower quality of non-monetary attributes.  Some of these attributes are not easily
quantifiable and consequently, it is difficult to calculate the true welfare losses based on
the more easily observable earnings losses.  But the magnitude of the true welfare losses
can be inferred from the subjective evaluations provided by the workers themselves.  An
overwhelming majority considered their current situation worse than it had been during
the period of state employment.  An also overwhelming majority would have preferred to
go back to state employment if given the choice.  The dismissed workers thus felt that
what they had lost had not been fully compensated by the severance pay they received.
The results of this paper give an idea not only about earnings losses, but also about
the extent of the welfare losses from dismissals due to privatization.  Moreover, they
show that the determinants of these losses are somewhat different.  Ideally, the insights
about the determinants of both earnings and welfare losses could prove useful to policy
makers in designing compensation packages for dismissed workers. Since the process of
privatization involves social and political sensitivities it is important for policy makers to
develop strategies dealing with it.
Finally, the results of this paper confirm several observations about the Turkish
labor market.  Not only there is segmentation of the labor market between public and
private sectors, but also there is segmentation between formal and informal sectors.
5 The
fact that most post-dismissal jobs lacked formal arrangements and social benefits implies
that for most workers the dismissals were a movement from the formal into the informal
sector of the economy.  Ultimately, the significant earnings and welfare losses point not
only to public sector rents but also to the poor quality of jobs in the private sector in terms
of both monetary and non-monetary attributes.  Clearly, improving the quality of those
jobs is a challenge to Turkey’s government.
                                                          
5  See Mazumdar (1989) for a discussion of labor market segmentation in developing countries.17
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APPENDIX
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
All Dismissed Cement Petkim All All
Variable Workers Workers Workers Working Non-Working
Education
a:
   Primary School
   Middle School
   High School
   Voc. High School
   University
State Tenure
Pre-State Tenure




















































































































































































Note: a: The standard deviations of the dummy variables are not reported for brevity but may be computed
from their reported means (m) as sd = (m(1-m))
↔ .